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Action

1958 JAN 17

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EUR
Info

FROM: BERLIN

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 843, JANUARY 17, 2 PM.

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PRIORITY

SENT BONN 778, DEPARTMENT 843; REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW, LONDON AND PARIS.

BONN PASS PRITY ACTION USAREUR AS BERLIN'S 193.

DCSI USAFE INFO OTHER MEANS.

SUBJECT: BERLIN ACCESS.

REFERENCE: OURTEL TO BONN 775, REPEATED DEPARTMENT 840.

DURING YESTERDAY'S SESSION WITH POLITICAL ADVISERS REPORTED REFTEL, KOTSIUBA CHOSE TO PLAY ROLE OF INJURED PARTY WHO WAS JUSTIFIABLY AMAZED, INDIGNANT, AND PERHAPS A LITTLE HURT AT ALLEGED MALPRACTICES AND WRONGFUL CONTENTIONS OF ALLIES. WHETHER ANY OF THIS WAS SINCERE IS DIFFICULT TO SAY. HE GAVE IMPRESSION THAT DEVELOPMENTS OF NIGHT OF JANUARY 14-15 HAD EXCEEDED SOVIE EXPECTATIONS, AND SETTING OF DEADLINE TWO WEEKS OFF WHEN SOVIE WOULD AGAIN ATTEMPT STAMP MOVEMENT ORDERS PERHAPS INDICATES RECOGNITION THAT THEIR ACTION AT CHECKPOINT MIGHT HAVE SOMEWHAT PRECIPITATE.

BRITISH AND FRENCH IN BERLIN ORIGINALLY WERE INCLINED TO THINK THAT, WHILE LACK OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION HIGHLY OBJECTIONABLE, ULTIMATE ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF STAMPING OF MOVEMENT ORDERS WOULD NOT INVOLVE UNACCEPTABLE CONCESSION OF IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE. THEY WERE FRANKLY SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AT POSITION AGREED TO BY THEIR EMBASSIES REPORTED EMBTEL 449 TO BERLIN 2155 TO DEPARTMENT. INSTRUCTIONS WHICH THEY RECEIVED PRIOR TO MEETING WITH KOTSIUBA WERE SOMEWHAT VAGUE AND SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT LACK OF PRIOR

NOTIFICATION WAS

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
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
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NOTIFICATION WAS BASIC REASON FOR OBJECTION TO SOVIET ACTION. HOWEVER, POLITICAL ADVISERS AGREED THAT TO LIMIT APPROACH TO KOTSIUBA ON THIS BASIS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO INVITE HIS GIVING "DUE NOTICE" ON THE SPOT, AND POSITION MUST BE BASED ON MORE SUBSTANTIVE GROUND IF NOT TO BE COMPLETELY LOST AT OUTSET. HENCE THEY WENT ALONG WITH LINE FOLLOWED OF WHICH BRITISH CHAIRMAN MADE EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION.

EMBASSY WILL HAVE NOTED THAT KOTSIUBA EMPHASIZED THAT MOTIVE OF SOVIETS FOR DESIRING TO PUT STAMPS ON MOVEMENT ORDERS WAS TO PREVENT ALLEGED "VIOLATION" OF NEW PROCEDURES OF DOCUMENTATION INVOLVED IN USE OF SINGLE ORDER BY SAME PERSON FOR SEVERAL TRIPS, KOTSIUBA HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY RAISED THIS POINT DURING DISCUSSIONS WHICH LED TO INSTITUTION OF NEW TYPE MOVEMENT ORDERS, AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THIS CONSIDERATION HAS REALLY BEEN MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN RECENT SOVIET ACTION. ONE POSSIBILITY IS THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE IS TO OBTAIN PROCEDURE BY WHICH ALLIED MOVEMENT ORDERS AND IDENTITY DOCUMENTS CAN BE EXAMINED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CHECKPOINT OFFICE WITH VIEW TO ATTEMPTING TO COMPILE DOSSIER ON LEAVE TRAVEL OR OTHER KIND OF TRAVEL IN WHICH SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE PARTICULAR INTEREST. BRITISH HERE ALSO FEEL THAT SOVIETS MAY HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO GDR TO PLACE SOVIET VISAS ON ALL ALLIED MOVEMENT ORDERS AND THAT THEY HAVE REPRESENTED THESE STAMPS AS VISAS TO GDR. BRITISH POINT TO EXPERIENCE OF SEVERAL OF THEIR TRAVELERS ON AUTOBAHN WHO HAVE HEARD VOPOS REFER TO STAMPS AS SOVIET VISAS, BUT THERE IS APPARENTLY NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS THEORY.

IN ANY EVENT, IF THERE IS ANY SCOPE FOR ALLIED COUNTERPROPOSALS, THEY MUST PRESUMABLY TAKE KOTSIUBA AT HIS WORD AND APPEAR TO MEET HIS POINT AGAINST REPEATED TRAVEL ON BASIS OF SAME MOVEMENT ORDER WITHOUT PERMITTING SOVIETS PHYSICALLY TO REMOVE MOVEMENT ORDERS AND STAMP THEM IN THEIR CHECKPOINT OFFICE. FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ALLIED POLITICAL ADVISERS HERE AND ARE TRIPARTITELY RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION BY EMBASSIES AS BASIS FOR FURTHER APPROACH TO SOVIETS: 1) WE TELL SOVIETS THAT RIGID INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN ALL ALLIED ISSUING AUTHORITIES THAT MOVEMENT ORDERS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE USED FOR MORE THAN SINGLE ROUND-TRIP BY

ANY TRAVELER



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ANY TRAVELER. SINCE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED AND WILL BE STRICTLY OBSERVED BY ALLIES, WE COULD ARGUE THAT THERE IS THUS NO NEED FOR STAMPING PROCEDURE; 2) IN ADDITION TO (1) ABOVE, ALLIES COULD UNDERTAKE TO HAVE THEIR TRAIN COMMANDERS OR OFFICERS AT RAILWAY STATIONS PUT DATE STAMPS ON TRAVEL ORDER WHICH WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF CANCELLING ORDER AFTER ROUND-TRIP HAD BEEN COMPLETED. THUS THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR ADDITIONAL SOVIET STAMPS AND SOVIETS COULD BE ASSURED THAT TRAVEL ORDERS WERE NOT BEING RE-USED.

WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH HERE FURTHER POSSIBILITY SUGGESTED IN USAREUR TELEGRAM SX 1244 OF JANUARY 16, OF HAVING STAMP ACTUALLY AFFIXED IN MARIENBORN IN PRESENCE OF SOVIET CHECKPOINT AUTHORITIES, BUT ASSUME EMBASSY WILL ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS THIS POSSIBILITY WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH. BY PERMITTING AT LEAST QUALIFIED SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN STAMPING PROCESS, USAREUR SUGGESTION CONTAINS MORE POTENTIAL FOR FACE SAVING AND IS THEREFORE MORE LIKELY TO BE ULTIMATELY ACCEPTABLE.

USCOB CONCURS.

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